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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE A CITY
COUNCIL TO DISANNEX TERRITORY UNDER
THE INDIANA LAW
The provision of the Indiana Constitution which requires that
there shall be a separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial
powers in the state government' has been held not to apply to muni-
cipal corporations or town and local boards created by the legislature. 2
It is aimed at the structure of the state government as created by the
constitution. This conclusion does not do violence to the language
of a constitutional provision requiring the separation of powers and
it is in keeping with the probable intent of those who framed this
particular provision.3 The result is a practical one which is neces-
sary to the efficient working of our local government units. It would
be exceedingly cumbersome if we had to have a strict division of
authority on the lines of executive, legislative, and judicial func-
tions in all the minor details of town and city government.
Granting this interpretation of the separation of powers as required
by the constitution, there remains the principle which was a part of
the common law and which has been given definite content in this
country through the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment,
that personal rights and private property shall not be taken without
due process of law. Thus not only in the common law, but probably
in all known systems of law, we have the principle that "one may not
be judge in his own case." 4 This was considered to be an essential
'-"The powers of the government are divided into three separate depart-
ments; the legislative, the executive, including the administrative, and the
judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these de-
partments shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided." Constitution of Indiana (1851) Act III,
See. I.
2 "The appellee argues that this cannot be done because it would be a
violation of article 3 of the Constitution of Indiana. The appellee is in
error.
In Baltimore & Oio Ry. Co. v. Town of Whiting, 161 Ind. 228 68 N. E.
266, this court held that this provision of the Constitution relates solely to
the state government and officers and their duties under one of the sepa-
rate departments of the state and not to municipal government and officers.
The executive and administrative duties of the mayors of cities and clerks
of towns or cities are not such as come within the executive and adminis-
trative department of the state government." Livengood et al. v. City of
Covington (Supreme Court of Indiana) 144 N. E. 416 at 419. See also
State ex reZ. v. Kirk, 44 Indiana 401.
3 "The office of councilman is an office purely and wholly municipal in
its character. He has no duties to perform under the general laws of the
state . . . these powers and duties of councilmen are beyond and in
addition to any acts, powers and duties performed by officers provided for
under the state government." State ex rel. v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401 at 406.
4 "Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa." Coke upon Littleton
Sec. 212.
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part of a fair trial according to law. At least from the time of Magna
Charta, the English courts acting on common law principles have not
hesitated to hold judicial proceedings invalid where private rights
or property were affected, if the proceedings were not before an im-
partial tribunal.5 In the United States this same result was reached
under the fifth amendment to the constitution, and later it was spe-
cifically covered for state legislation by the fourteenth amendment.
Under the fourteenth amendment the courts have held that whatever
else may be necessary to due process of law it is certain that one may
not be deprived of personal liberty or private property without due
notice and a fair hearing.6 Now what shall constitute "due notice"
and a "fair hearing" in the particular case, is, of course, a matter for
the determination of the courts in view of the actual situation in-
volved. Thus what would be a fair hearing in the granting of a
license to practice a trade or profession might not be a fair hearing
to take valuable property under condemnation proceedings; but re-
gardless of the kinds of rights affected or the amount of property
involved, there has been very little qualification of the rule that the
tribunal which is deciding the matter must be impartial.7
5 "It is against reason, that if wrong be done any man, that he thereof
should be his own judge. For it is a maxim in law, aliquis non debet esse
judex in propria causa. And therefore a fine levied before the bailiffs of
Sapol was reversed, because one of the bailiffs was party to the fine, quia
non protest esse judex et par." 14 Vin. Abr. 573. 4 Com. Dig. 6. See also
2H. 3. 4.; 3H. 4.; SH. 6. 19.; 5H. 7. 9. B.
"There is also a maxim of law regarding judicial action which may have
an important bearing upon the constitutional validity of judgments in some
cases. No one ought to be a judge in his own cause; and so inflexible and
so manifestly just is this rule, that Lord Coke has laid it down that "even
an act of Parliament made against natural equity, as to make a man a
judge in his own case, is void in itself; for jura naturoe sunt immutablilia,
and there are leges legum." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, Seventh Edi-
tion, 592.
G"As applied to the chief executive officers of the federal and state
governments, municipal officers, heads of bureaus or departments, revenue
and tax commissioners or boards, boards of health, and the like, the con-
stitution forbids them to deprive any citizen of his property or rights in
any arbitrary, unjust, or confiscatory manner, or in any proceeding to
which he is not a party, although, if he has proper notice, the constitutional
requirement is satisfied by giving him a full and fair opportunity to be
heard in his own behalf and in defense of his rights or property, either in
the proceednigs before the board or officer, or else on an appeal to the
courts, to which he shall be entitled as of right and without onerous re-
strictions or conditions . . ." Black's Constitutional Law, pp. 595
and 596.
See also United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 252, 25 Sup. Ct. 644, 49 L.
Ed. 1040; Frank Waterhouse & Co. v. United States, 159 Fed. 876, 87 C. C.
A. 56; Hopkins v. Fachant, 130 Fed. 839, 65 C. C. A. 1; United States v.
Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 24 Sup. Ct. 621, 48 L. Ed. 917; Smith 'U. State
Board of Medical Examiners (Iowa) 117 N. W. 1116.
7 "To empower one party to a controversy to decide it for himself is not
within the legislative authority, because it is not the establishment of any
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In Town of St. John, etc., v. John P. Gerlack, et at, (decided Feb-
ruary 19, 1926),8 the supreme court of Indiana has upheld the con-
stitutionality of an Indiana statute which provides for a proceeding
before the common council of a city where individuals wish to have
the subdivision in which they live disannexed from the city of which
it then forms a part. (38913-8918, Burns 1914, Ch. 279 I acts 1
1907.)9 The statute provides that wherever the owners of one-tenth
or more of the lots in such subdivision desire disannexation from the
city, they may file a petition before the common council praying for
disannexation of the entire subdivision. Remonstrances against such
disannexation may be filed by any other owners of lots in the sub-
division and "such order shall be made by the . . . council
rule of action or decision, but is a placing of the other party, so far as that
controversy is concerned, out of the protection of the law, and submitting
him to the control of one whose interest it will be to decide arbitrarily and
unjustly." Cooley-Constitutional Limitations, Seventh Edition, 594.
See also Ames v. Port Huron Log-Driving and Booming Co., 11 Mich.
139; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219; State v. Crane, 36 N. J. 394; Cypress
Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.) 350; Scuffletown Fence Co. v.
McAllister, 12 Bush, 312; Reas v. Kearns, 5 Cold. 217.
8 Town of St. John & etc. v. John P. Gerlach et al, No. 24427, Suprem6
Court of Indiana. Decided February 19, 1926.
9 "The owner or owners of one-tenth or more in number of the lots in
any addition or subdivision to any city or town may file his, their or its
petition in writing with the board of public works or common council of any
city or board of trustees of any town praying for the disaniiexation of said
entire addition or subdivision, if one side or more thereof, or any part of
the same, shall form the corporate boundary of such city or town, setting
forth a copy of such plat, notice of the filing of which and the hearing
thereon shall be given as provided in this act. Remonstrances against the
granting of such petition may be filed by the owner of any lot or lots in
such addition, and such order shall be made by the board or council hearing
the same as shall be just and equitable in the premises: Provided, how-
ever, that if the owner or owners of more than one-half of the lots in
such addition or subdivision file his, their or its remonstrance or remon-
strances in writing against the granting of the petition for disannexa-
tion the board or council hearing the same shall have no power or juris-
diction to proceed further, but shall at once dismiss such proceedings at
the cost, if any incurred, of the petitioner or petitioners. If an appeal shall
be prosecuted from the board or council the city or town may by its at-
torney appear therein and take such action as the due protection of its
interests may require . . ." Sec. 8913, Burns, 1914.
"When authority is herein given to and conferred upon the board of
public works or common council of any city or the board of trustees of any
town, to hear and determine any matter, such board or council shall have
the power to call witnesses by subpcena to appear before it, to punish for a
contempt of its authority, and to adjourn its hearings from time to time
as to said board or council may seem expedient. An appeal will lie from
the decision of any board to the circuit court of the county where any of
the lots or lands affected lie, whereupon said matters shall be tried de novo
with like proceedings as other civil actions . Sec. 8917 Burns,
1914.
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hearing the same as shall be just and equitable in the premises." But
the council may grant or refuse the petition even though no one con-
tests it. It is further provided that if an appeal is taken from the
decision of the city council, "the city . may by its attorney
appear therein and take such action as the due protection of its inter-
ests may require." The statute provides that if there is no appeal from
the decision of the council, the record shall be certified to the county
auditor for taxation purposes in conformity with the decision. But
there is also a right of appeal to the circuit court of the county in
which the land lies. Such later trial in the regular courts shall be
de navo, conducted according to the usual procedure of such courts
with full right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the state.
It appeared in Town. of St. John v. Gerlah 0° that the appellees had
petitioned the council under this statute for disannexation of a cer-
tain territory and the petition had been denied. There was a trial
de novo in the circuit court in which this decision of the city council
was reversed, and it was decreed that disannexation should be granted.
On appeal to the supreme court the judgment below was affirmed
but the question of the constitutionality of the statute was not dis-
cussed since the court said that this had already been determined in
Livengood v. City of Covington.." This case involved the same pro-
visions as the St. John ease. The supreme court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute and based its decision in this part of the case
entirely upon Forsythe v. City of Hammond.12 It was conceded by
both parties in the case that the city council in passing upon the
question with an appeal to the courts was acting in a judicial capacity.
The decision in Forsythe v. Hammond definitely held that the an-
nexation of property to a municipality was a legislative function,
but since the Indiana constitution did not prevent a merging of legis-
lative and judicial functions in the field of municipal government,
the statute was not bad on that ground. 13
10 Ante Note 7.
11 Livengood et aL. v. City of Covington (No. 42124, Supreme Court of
Indiana, June 11, 1924), 144 N. E. 416.
"Forsythe v. City of Hammond, 142 Ind. 505, 40 N. E. 267, 30 L. R. A.
576. Litigation involving the same parties took place in the Federal Courts
when the plaintiff prayed an injunction forbidding the city to collect taxes
under the decision of the county board. Here also the court upheld the
statute saying that judicial proceedings before this legislative body were
peculiarly fitting in this case since the Indiana constitution required that the
boundaries of cities and towns be fixed or changed only by general statutes.
Forsythe v. Hammond, 68 Fed. 774 at 775.
13 "It may be conceded that annexation of territory to a city is a legis-
lative function. This function is exercised by the common council when
it resolves to annex certain described lands to the city, and to present a
petition therefor to the county board.
It must be admitted, however, as we think, that the after proceedings
had upon the petition are of a judicial nature. The petition must give the
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As a matter of controlling judicial decision the case of Livengood
v. City of Covington seems to be of doubtful authority so far as it
upholds these statutory provisions. That part of the decision is rest-
ed entirely upon Forsythe v. Hammond which did not involve dis-
annexation under this provision of the statute. Forsythe v. Hammond
involved annexation under Rev. Stat. 1894 See. 3659 & 4224: Rev.
Stat. 1881.14 These provisions in the Revised Statutes of 1894 pro-
vide that where there has been an annexation of territory to a city
against the will of the owner of the property in proceedings before
the Board of County Commissioners, there may be an appeal to the
circuit court. This is quite a different matter. Thus it is rightly said
in the Forsythe case that there is a judicial determination of the pe-
tition for annexation as between the contesting parties. It appears
further that there is a fair trial here since the Board of County Com-
missioners is not directly interested in any way in a law suit between
a city and adjoining property owners.1 The great difference be-
tween the Forsythe case based on annexation proceedings in which
the city and property owners contest annexation before the Board of
County Commissioners, and Town of St. John v. Gerlach and Liven-
good v. Covington in which two groups of private owners contest the
question of disannexation before a city council is this: in the first
case it is an impartial hearing and all the parties at interest are be-
fore the court; in the second case the city itself has an interest in the
outcome of the case which its own city council is deciding. Since the
taxes in the city and financial projects of great importance in the
field of public improvements are directly affected by disannexation
of part of the city's territory, it is clear that the municipality as a
corporation is interested in the outcome of that litigation. No pro-
vision, however, is made for the interests of the city to be represented
before the council. It seems to be inferred that the city council will
look out for the city's interests in those proceedings. This is substan-
tiated by the statute which provides that if there is an appeal from
reasons why, in the opinion of the council the annexation should take
place. The sufficiency of such reasons, and whether they in fact exist,
calls for the decision of the tribunal appointed to hear the petition. No-
tice of the presentation of the petition is also provided for, and adverse
parties are thus brought in. Whether the proper preliminary steps have
been takn, whether the reasons given in the petition are true, and are suffi-
cient, seem to be questions calling for a judicial examination and de-
cision ...
But if the board, in considering and deciding upon the petition, acts in a
judicial capacity, certainly the Legislature may, as it has done in this
case, provide for an appeal to the courts, to determine whether the city
council, and the county board have complied with the statutory require-
ments in the action taken " Forsythe v. Hammond, v42 Ind.
pp. 516 and 517.
14Forsythe v. Hammond, 142 Ind. pp. 505 and 507.
25Ante Note 12.
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the decision of the council to the circuit court "the 'city
may by its attorney appear therein and take such action as the due
protection of its interests may require." In both the Town of St.
Johiin v. Gerlack and Livengood v. City of Covington, the city whose
council had been judge in the first trial was one of the principle
parties litigant in the trial de vovo on appeal.
The statute provides for trial de 'ovo in the circuit court upon
appeal from the decision of the city council. It might be contended
that since there was a completely new trial, the fact that the city
was interested in the result did not make the proceedings bad. Such
reasoning would go on the ground that the hearing before the coun-
cil was an administrative investigation of a preliminary nature and
that it was not unconstitutional to require this in view of the fact
that disannexation of territory was essentially a legislative matter
anyway. Such a position, however, is not tenable. It is conceded
that the council renders a judicial decision under this statute. Thus
for these purposes the council is made a part of the entire judicial
system, and it is well settled that a court created by the constitution
and independent of the legislature cannot be required on appeal to
hear cases that are not of a judicial nature? 6 In case of collateral
attack the courts would hold that this decision by the city council
would have all the dignity and prerogatives of a judicial decision.
It may be added that while the technical significance of trial de vovo
is conceded, several courts have taken the view that the decision in
the first instance is not nugatory in its effect upon the higher court,
but that it has considerable persuasive value inasmuch as the whole
matter is considered to be partly political rather than entirely a ques,-
tion of judicial determination of private rights."
While in general a statute resting judicial authority in a tribunal
is unconstitutional if that body has an interest which would prejudice
an impartial determination of the case, there are still certain excep-
tions to this rule. It may be conceded that these exceptions lie for
the most part in this very field of local governing bodies. There are
many cases which uphold the constitutionality of statutes that require
interested bodies to pass upon the claims of minor public office holders.
These bodies are held to give a valid judicial decision although their
members may be advantaged by holding the present occupant to be
disentitled to the office. It is submitted that these cases are limited
in scope and that they form an exception to the general rule. They
go on the ground that the right to public office is a political question;
'aHeybun's case, 2 DaU. 409; Mluskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346.
27Foreman, et al. v. Toum of Marianna, 43 Ark. 324; Dodson, et al. v.
Mayor and Town Council, Fort Smith 33 Ark. 508.
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that it is essentially a public matter for political organs to handle and
that rules of procedure in private litigation do not altogether apply.'8
On the other hand the courts have gone far to hold that individual
members of bodies exercising judicial functions are disqualified where
they have a personal interest in the result.19 It is submitted that in
this case the several members of the city council who pass on dis-
annexation might have such a personal interest in the result that they
might be disqualified. Thus members of the city council may be
property owners within the city and their general and special taxes
greatly increased by disannexation. The cases hold that members of
a court may be affected in their personal taxes by a decision involv-
ing bona fide litigants and still be qualified to decide the case. But
that situation is not involved here. One of the parties directly affected
by this proceeding is the city itself and it is represented only by its
own city council which is sitting in judgment on the case. The de-
cision in the case does not affect the members of the council inciden-
tally; it affects them as governing officers of the municipal corpora-
tion which has a financial interest in the result of the litigation.2 0
But apart' from the probable disqualification of individual members
of the council because of financial interest in the result, the most
serious objection to the constitutionality of the statute is that the city
council as representing the city's interests is exercising a function
that is incompatible with a fair hearing as required by due process of
law. It would seem strange if the statute provided for the city
attorney to represent the city's interests in such a proceeding before
the council since it would be patent that the city's legal interests were
being pleaded before a quasi judicial body which had a very strong
legislative bias in favor of the city's claim. This at least would be
arguable, however, on the ground that you could have a valid merg-
ing of legislative and judicial functions in a municipal body. The
present statute cannot be defended on this ground. It does not
18 Commonwealth v. Reed, 1 Gray 475; Justices v. Fennimore, 1 N. J.
190; Commissioners v. Little, 3 Ohio 289.
19 Stahl, et al. v. Board of Supervisors of Ringgold County, et al. 187
Iowa 1342, 175 N. W. 772, 11 A. L. R. 185; Luthey v. Ream, 270 111. 170,
110 N. E. 375; Hunt v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 183; Nulta v. Cor. Belt Bank, 164
Ill. 427, 45 N. E. 954.
20 Lanfear v. Mayor, et al., 4 Louisiana Annual 97, 23 American Decisions
477. This case seems to involve precisely the same principles as the St.
John case and the Covington case. There an ordinance of the city coun-
cil authorized the mayor to confiscate property left on the levee in violation
of the police regulations. The court held that the amount of property was
so great that it could not properly be disposed of summarily under the po-
lice power. There must be a judicial hearing on the question and the
mayor and council could not decide this case since the city would profit
by the sale of the confiscated property.
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come within the Prentiss case or recent cases that sanction a judicial
decision by a body which also exercises legislative functions.21 In
the instant case, the objection to the city council is not that it may
be exercising both judicial and legislative functions as to the litiga-
tion before it, but that the municipal corporation, which the council
governs, is directly interested in the result and is not represented in
the litigation. It seems that the city's interests are entrusted to the




Indiana University School of Law.
2  Prentiss v. Atlantio Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210.
22 Stah v. Board of Ringgold County, 187 Iowa 1342, 175 N. W. 772, 11
A. L. R. 185.
